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Transmission of prices and price volatility in Australian electricity spot 
markets: A multivariate GARCH analysis 
 
Andrew Worthington
‡, Adam Kay-Spratley, Helen Higgs 
 
School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the transmission of spot electricity prices and price volatility among the five Australian 
electricity markets in the National Electricity Market (NEM): namely, New South Wales (NSW), Queensland 
(QLD), South Australia (SA), the Snowy Mountains H ydroelectric Scheme (SNO) and Victoria (VIC). A 
multivariate generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) model is used to identify the 
source and magnitude of spillovers. The results indicate the presence of positive own mean spillovers in only a small 
number of markets and no mean spillovers between any of the markets. This appears to be directly related to the 
limitations of the present system of regional interconnectors. Nevertheless, the large number of significant own-
volatility and cross-volatility spillovers in all five markets indicates the presence of strong ARCH and GARCH 
effects. Contrary to evidence from studies in North American electricity markets, the results also indicate that 
Australian electricity spot prices are stationary.  
 
JEL classification: C51, G15 
Keywords: spot electricity price markets; mean and volatility spillovers; multivariate GARCH 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Electricity plays a vital role in all developed economies, including Australia. However, the 
Australian economy’s reliance on electricity generation, transmission and distribution has for the 
most part (and in common with most other economies) been largely taken for granted. The 
overall result has been that until comparatively recently the electricity supply i ndustry has 
assumed a lesser role in the economic agenda when compared to many other industries. This is 
paradoxical, especially when one considers the importance of electricity in Australian economic 
development (Dickson et. al. 2000: 5): 
 
The Australian  electricity industry is one of the most important sectors of the Australian 
economy. With over $74 billion in assets, 33000 employees and annual investment of over $2.4 
billion, it directly contributes an estimated 1.4 per cent to gross domestic product. 
 
However, in the last decade of the twentieth century the electricity industry in Australia and 
around the world changed significantly as governments, suppliers and consumers recognized its 
importance within the broader themes of globalization and competitive reform. This lead to an 
important paradigm shift, entailing a move away from the heavily regulated, vertically integrated 
state-based monopolies of the past to more market-based structures for electricity suppliers in the 
present, and towards potentially more competitive outcomes for consumers in the future. The 
many reforms reached their culmination with the establishment of the National Electricity 
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Market (NEM) on 13 December 1998 when the five regional spot electricity markets were joined 
together (NEMMCO: 2000: 2). All the same, it should be noted that very gradual move to an 
integrated national system was predated by substantial reforms on a state-by-state basis, 
including the unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution and the commercialization 
and privatization of the new electricity companies, along with the establishment of the wholesale 
electricity spot markets. For example, the wholesale market for electricity in Victoria and New 
South Wales commenced as early as 1994 and 1996, respectively, though it was not until 1998 
that the market for electricity in Queensland began. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the key importance of market pricing within each spot market and the 
integration of the separate state-based electricity markets within a single national market, very 
little empirical evidence currently exists in Australia concerning the pricing behaviour of the 
deregulated electricity market. This is important, not only because “…the spot price strongly 
influence the contract price which, in turn, largely dictates the final price for consumer [but also] 
because the spot price represents a considerable element of cost for direct purchasers of power, 
such as large industrial companies” (Robinson 2000: 527). The short tenure of the Australian 
electricity spot market is the most apparent, though not the only, reason. In actual fact, very little 
work has been undertaken in any context that provides a detailed understanding of electricity 
price behaviour and almost none using the advanced econometric  techniques so increasingly 
widespread in work on, say, financial markets. The few studies that do exist are especially 
noteworthy.  
 
Deng (2000), for example, proposed several stochastic models of energy commodity price 
behaviour specifically in the context of a deregulated electricity industry. Using a number of 
models and assumptions [including mean-reversion, jump-diffusion and regime-switching] Deng 
(2000) aimed to more accurately reflect the physical characteristics of electricity in commodity 
spot price behaviour models as a first step in applying a real options approach to valuing physical 
assets in the electricity industry. 
 
An earlier study by De Vany and Walls  (1999a) took a somewhat different approach to 
understanding electricity pricing behaviour by examining regional power markets in the western 
United States for evidence of integration over the period December 1994 to April 1996. The 
eleven regional markets analysed included California/Oregon, Four-Corners, Central Rockies, 
Inland Southwest, Mead, Mid-Columbia, Midway/Sylmar, Northern California, 
Northwest/Northern Rockies, Palo Verde and Southern California. Using daily spot prices 
collected from the day ahead over-the-counter market De Vany and Wall (1999a) employed 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests to first detect the presence of non-stationarity in 
both peak and off-peak series for all markets, with the exception of off-peak prices in the 
Northern California market.  
 
De Vany and Walls (1999a) also applied cointegration analysis to test for price convergence 
between these markets. The results indicated a high degree of market integration between the not 
necessarily physically connected markets, with cointegration being found for peak prices in 
forty-eight of the fifty-five market pairs (87 percent) and all fifty-five market pairs for off-peak 
prices. De Vany and Wall (1999a) argued that the lack of cointegration in several markets was 
evidence of transfer constraints within some parts of the Western Electricity Grid, though on the Worthington, Kay-Spratley and Higgs 
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whole the study’s findings was suggestive of an efficient and stable wholesale power market. A 
subsequent study by Lucia and Schwartz (2001) also used cointegration techniques, though in the 
context of the deregulated Norwegian electricity market and with an emphasis on the relationship 
between spot and derivative electricity prices. Using a sample of 2,555 daily prices (including 
peak and off-peak) in the period commencing 1 January 1993 Lucia and Schwartz (2001) 
concluded that electricity prices in both the Norwegian spot and derivative markets were 
stationary.  
 
In an alternative approach, De Vany and Walls (1999b) specified a subset of five of the eleven 
previously used regional markets [CA-OR-NV Border, 4-Corners, Inland Southwest, Palo Verde 
and Southern California] to apply vector autoregressive (VAR) modelling techniques. As in the 
earlier cointegration analysis, the study confirmed that both peak and off-peak spot prices for 
electricity contained a unit root. The results of separate variance decomposition analyses also 
indicated that during off-peak periods, the larger proportion of price shocks were absorbed 
locally and only a small proportion of the shocks propagated to other interconnected nodal 
markets. Conversely, during peak periods a larger proportion of shocks propagated from the 
originating node to more distant interconnected market nodes. On this basis, De Vany and Wall 
(1999b: 139) concluded “the wholesale price of power, in peak and off-peak periods, is 
dynamically stable in the five major markets…prices fall within a narrow range and the average 
prices at the interconnected points are almost equal to one another”. Moreover, “the efficiency of 
power pricing on the western transmission grid is testimony to the ability of decentralised 
markets and local arbitrage to produce a global pattern of nearly uniform prices over a complex 
and decentralised transmission network spanning vast distances” (De Vany and Walls 1999b: 
139). It is within the context of this limited empirical work that the present study is undertaken. 
The paper itself is divided into five main areas. The second section briefly surveys the 
establishment and operation of the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM). The third 
section explains the data employed in the present analysis, while the fourth section discusses the 
methodology employed. The results are dealt with in the fifth section. The paper ends with some 
brief concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) 
 
The Australian National Electricity  Market (NEM) encompasses electricity generators in the 
eastern state electricity markets of Australia operating as a nationally interconnected grid. The 
member jurisdictions of the NEM thus include the three most populous states of New South 
Wales (NSW) [including the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)], Victoria (VIC) and 
Queensland (QLD) along with South Australia (SA). The only non-State based member that 
currently provides output into the NEM is the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme (SNO). 
The SNO is regarded as a special case owing to the complexity of arrangements underlying both 
its original construction and operating arrangements involving both the state governments of 
New South Wales and Victoria, as well as the Commonwealth (federal) government. Of these 
member jurisdictions, the largest generation capacity is found in NSW, followed in descending 
order by Queensland, Victoria, the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme and South Australia. 
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It is intended that the island state of Tasmania will become a member of the NEM pending 
completion of the Basslink interconnector, which will link Tasmania’s electricity supply industry 
with that of the mainland. The remaining Australian state of Western Australia along with the 
Northern Territory are unlikely to participate in the NEM in the foreseeable future due to the 
economic and physical unfeasibility of 
interconnection and transmission 
augmentation across such geographically 
dispersed and distant areas. At present, 
the NEM supplies electricity to 7.7 
million Australian customers on the 
interconnected national grid that runs 
through Queensland, New South Wales, 
the Australian Capital Territory, Victoria 
and South Australia. Peak electricity 
demand is highest in NSW, followed by 
Victoria, Queensland and South 
Australia. In terms of net aggregate 
capacity and demand, NSW, Queensland, South Australia and the Snowy are potentially overall 
net exporters of electricity while Victoria is a net importer. Some $8 billion of energy is traded 
through the NEM yearly within these jurisdictions. 
 
The NEM currently comprises more than seventy registered participants within the five member 
jurisdictions who fall into six categories based on the role they perform in the market. Some 
participants fill more than a single role within the NEM and therefore belong to more than one 
category. The categories are: generators; Distribution Network Service Providers (DNSP); 
market customers (including both electricity retailers and end-use customers); Transmission 
Network Service Providers (TNSP); Market Network Service Providers (MNSP) and traders.  
 
In terms of electricity generation, the NEM relies on fossil fuels. In NSW, Queensland and 
Victoria electricity production is almost entirely coal-fuelled, while there are gas-powered 
stations in South Australia. Hydroelectricity plants operate in the Snowy Mountains region. 
Generators may be privately or publicly owned and fall into four categories according to their 
obligation to participate in the NEM. 
These are: market generators 
(generators whose entire output is sold 
through NEMMCO's spot market), non-
market generators (generators whose 
entire output is sold directly to a local 
retailer or customer outsider the spot 
market system), scheduled generators 
(individual or groups of generators with 
a capacity rating over 30 megawatts, 
and whose output is scheduled by 
NEMMCO's dispatch instructions) and 
non-scheduled generators (individual or Worthington, Kay-Spratley and Higgs 
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groups of generators with a capacity rating of less than 30 megawatts). All generators or groups 
of generators with a capacity rating of 5-30 megawatts must register with NEMMCO. 
 
The NEM was developed and operates under a number of legislative agreements, memorandums 
of understanding and protocols between the participating jurisdictions. They include a 
mechanism for uniformity of relevant electricity legislation across states, implementation of the 
National Electricity Code (NEC) and the creation of the National Electricity Code Administrator 
(NECA) and the National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) to control and 
implement the NEM. The NECA is the organisation charged with administering the NEC. This 
entails monitoring participant compliance with the Code and raising Code breaches with the 
National Electricity Tribunal (IEA: 2001: 132). Other roles of the NECA include managing 
changes to the NEC and establishing procedures for dispute resolution, consultative, and 
reporting procedures (NEMMCO, 2001: 28). The NECA also established the Reliability Panel in 
1997, in order to “determine power system security and reliability standards, and monitor market 
reliability” (IEA: 2001: 132). 
 
The market rules that govern the operation of the NEM are embedded in the NEC, which was 
developed in consultation with government, industry and consumers during the  mid-1990s. 
NEMMCO (2001: 4) summarises the rationale for the thoroughness of the NEC: 
 
The rules and standards of the Code ensure that all parties seeking to be part of the electricity 
network should have access on a fair and reasonable basis. The Code also defines technical 
requirements for the electricity networks, generator plant, and customer connection equipment to 
ensure that electricity delivered to the customers meets prescribed standards.   
 
The NEC required authorisation by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) to be implemented, as do any changes. Born from the Hilmer microeconomic reforms in 
the 1990s the ACCC is the peak Australian body aimed at enforcing competition law. To this 
affect, the ACCC is responsible for administering the Trade Practices Act (1974), which was 
augmented under the National Competition Policy (NCP) reforms to facilitate access 
arrangements to network infrastructure and the addition of competitive neutrality provisions, 
which ensure there can be no discrimination between public and private service providers. Asher 
(1998: 10) highlights the key change to the Trade Practices Act (1974) under the National 
Competition Policy reforms as “establishing a third party access regime to cover the services 
provided by significant infrastructure facilities” (facilities not economically feasible to duplicate 
and where the access arrangements would be necessary to promote effective competition in 
upstream or downstream markets).  
 
In addition to the administration of this role in regard to market infrastructure, the ACCC is the 
organisation responsible for the regulation of the transmission network component of the 
Australian Electricity Supply Industry. Of the various facets this role encompasses, transmission 
pricing is the most prominent. This is managed by the ACCC on a revenue cap basis, in an 
attempt “to constrain monopoly pricing while allowing the business owners a rate of return 
sufficient to fund network operation and expansion” (ACCC, 2000: 8). In brief, the ACCC’s 
price cap methodology is (IEA 2001: 137): 
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The revenue of transmission companies is regulated on the basis of an adjusted replacement 
value of the assets, known as deprival value, and its weighted cost of capital. The maximum 
annual revenue allowed to transmission is subject to a CPI-X price cap, fixed for a period of at 
least five years, that reduces transmission charges over time in real terms.  
 
The transmission-pricing role is carried out in conjunction with a service reliability protocol, to 
ensure quality of service. As noted, changes to the NEC effecting transmission or any other 
aspect of the market must be authorised by the ACCC. As such the ACCC is responsible for the 
evaluation of changes to market operations. It is the role of the National Electricity Market 
Management Company (NEMMCO) to implement and administer changes to market operation. 
 
The National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) operates the wholesale 
market for electricity trade between generators and retailers (and also large consumers). From an 
operational perspective, output from generators is pooled then scheduled to meet demand. The 
IEA (2001: 134) summarises the core elements as follows: 
 
The National Electricity Market is a mandatory auction in which generators o f 30 MW 
[megawatts] or more and wholesale market customers compete. Generators submit bids 
consisting of simple price-quantity pairs specifying the amount of energy they are prepared to 
supply at a certain price. Up to ten such pairs can be submitted per day. In principle, these bids 
are firm and can only be altered under certain conditions. Generator bids are used to construct a 
merit order of generation. Customer bids are used to construct a demand schedule. Dispatch 
minimises the cost of meeting the actual electricity demand, taking into account transmission 
constraints for each of the five regions in which the market is divided…There are no capacity 
payments or any other capacity mechanisms.  
 
The two key aspects required for the pool to operate are a centrally coordinated dispatch 
mechanism and operation of the ‘spot market’ process. As the market operator, NEMMCO 
coordinates dispatch to “balance electricity supply and demand requirements” (NEMMCO, 
2001: 3), which is required because of the instantaneous nature of electricity, and the spot price 
is then “the clearing price [that] matches supply with demand” (NEMMCO, 2001: 3). 
 
The pool rules dictate that generators in the NEM with a capacity greater than 30MW are 
required to submit bidding schedules (prices for supplying different levels of generation) to 
NEMMCO on a day before basis. Separate capacity schedules are submitted for each of the 48 
half-hour periods of the day. As a result, the industry supply curve (also called a bid stack) may 
be segmented to a maximum extent of ten times the number of generators bidding into the pool. 
NEMMCO determines prices every five minutes on a real time basis. This is achieved by 
matching expected demand in the next five minutes against the bid stack for that half-hour 
period. The price offered by the last generator to be dispatched (plant are dispatched on a least-
cost basis) to meet total demand sets the five-minute price. The price for the half-hour trading 
period (or pool price) is the time-weighted average of the six five-minute periods comprising the 
half-hour trading period. This is the price generators receive for the actual electricity they 
dispatch into the pool, and is the price market customers pay to receive generation in that half 
hour period.
  
 Worthington, Kay-Spratley and Higgs 
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6  $40/MWh  12:05pm  290 
5  $38/MWh  12:10pm  330 
4  $37/MWh  12:15pm  360 
3  $35/MWh  12:20pm  410 
2  $33/MWh  12:25pm  440 
1  $32/MWh  12:30pm  390 
 
An illustration of spot market pricing in the NEM is drawn from NEMMCO (2000: 12). Table 1 
contains offer prices for six generators (in megawatt hours) and demand information (in 
megawatts) for the six five-minute dispatch periods in the 12:30 trading interval. Assuming each 
of these generators has 100 MW (megawatts) of capacity, Figure 1 graphically analyses the least 
cost dispatch for these five-minute intervals. For example, at 12:05 total demand is 290 MW and 
to meet this demand the full capacity of the lowest priced generators 1 ($32 MWh) and 2 ($33 
MWh) and most of the capacity of generator 3 ($35 MWh) is required.  The marginal price for 
this five-minute interval is then $35 MWh. This information, along with the remaining five-
minute intervals until 12:30, is tabulated in Table 2, which shows the marginal price for each 
five-minute interval as a result of the plant dispatch mix, which is primarily dependant on the 
level of demand. The pool price for the 12:30 trading interval is the average of these six five-
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(MW)  Scenario 
Point A  35  12:05pm  290  Generators 1 & 2 are fully utilised. 
Generator 3 is partially utilised. 
Point B  37  12:10pm  330  Generators 1,2 & 3 are fully utilised. 
Generator 4 is partially utilised. 
Point C  37  12:15pm  360  Generators 1,2 & 3 are fully utilised. 
Generator 4 is partially utilised. 
Point D  38  12:20pm  410  Generators 1,2, 3 & 4 are fully utilised. 
Generator 5 is partially utilised. 
Point E  38  12:25pm  440  Generators 1,2, 3 & 4 are fully utilised. 
Generator 5 is partially utilised. 
Point F  37  12:30pm  390  Generators 1,2 & 3 are fully utilised. 
Generator 4 is partially utilised. 
The spot price is calculated as: ($35/MWh + $37/MWh + $37/MWh + $38/MWh + $38/MWh + 
$37/MWh) / 6 = $37/MWh 
 
The spot pricing procedure, while bringing balance between supply and demand, can also expose 
participants to significant variation. This is owing to the dependence of the pool process on 
generator bidding strategies [for instance,  Brennan et al.  (1998) highlight the potential for 
holders of large generating portfolios to bid non-competitively in order to exercise market 
power] and the impact of the complex interaction of supply and demand factors on pricing. As 
such the spot price can be volatile, leading to large financial exposure. The occurrence of various 
phenomenon in the NEM have seen instances of high spot prices, and in some cases the 
maximum price cap for the NEM (Value of Lost Load) has been triggered.  
 
Events in the past, which have had a tendency to drive NEM prices toward the upper end of the 
price spectrum, are of three types. First, prices can increase dramatically when a generation plant 
‘trips’ or ‘falls over’, rendering it inoperable and forcing the plant’s contributed capacity to be 
removed from the bid stack. This is particularly the case if the plant provides base load output. 
Secondly, abnormal environmental temperatures drive demand up as customers increase their 
need for cooling or heating. Higher demand requires more generation to balance the system, 
which means plant bidding in at a higher price level on the least-cost merit order are sequentially 
dispatched to meet the additional demand. Third, technical constraints or faults with the systems 
design can also lead to higher prices. These three instances combined to cause an electricity 
supply crisis for Victoria in February 2000, as profiled by the IEA (2001: 123): 
 
The Victorian outages reflected a combination of unusual circumstances, including an industrial 
dispute, which had taken around 20 per cent of generating capacity off line, two unplanned 
generator outages, and an extremely high peak demand caused by a heat wave across 
southeastern Australia. The situation was exacerbated by Victorian government intervention to 
introduce a price cap and establish consumption restrictions, which prolonged the shortages and 
distorted market responses…The mandatory consumption restrictions introduced by the 
Victorian government over six days lowered demand in Victoria and had the perverse effect of 
electricity flowing from Victoria into New South Wales and South Australia while the 
restrictions were in place.    
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Historically, each State in the NEM developed its own transmission network and linked it to 
another State's system via interconnector transmission lines. Power is transmitted between 
regions to meet energy demands that are higher than local generators can provide, or when the 
price of electricity in an adjoining region is low enough to displace the local supply. The 
scheduling of generators to meet demand across the interconnected power system is constrained 
by the physical transfer capacity of the interconnectors between the regions. When the limit of an 
interconnector is reached, NEMMCO schedules the most cost-efficient sources of supply from 
within the region to meet the remaining demand. For example, if prices are very low in Victoria 
and high in South Australia, up to 500 megawatts of electricity can be exported to South 
Australia across the interconnector. Once this limit is reached, the system will then use the 
lowest priced generators in South Australia to meet the outstanding consumer demand.  
 
The limitations of transfer capability within the centrally coordinated and regulated NEM are one 
of its defining features. Queensland has two interconnectors that together can import and export 
880 MW to and from NSW, NSW can export 850 MW to the Snowy and 3000 MW from the 
Snowy and Victoria can import 1500 MW from the Snowy and 250 MW from South Australia 
and export 1100 MW to the Snowy and 500 MW to 
South Australia. There is currently no direct connector 
between NSW and South Australia and Queensland is 
only connected directly to NSW. 
 
The illustration of NEMMCO’s dispatch and spot pricing 
methodology highlights the inherent volatility of the spot 
price, which can lead to large variations in financial 
exposure. This is owing to the dependence of the pool 
process on generator bidding strategies and the impact of 
the complex interaction of supply and demand factors on 
pricing. Further, while the appropriate regulatory and 
commercial mechanisms do exist for the creation of an 
efficient national market, and these are expected to have 
an impact on the price of electricity in each member 
jurisdiction, the complete integration of the five separate 
spot electricity markets has not yet been realised. In 
particular, the limitation of the interconnectors between 
the member jurisdictions suggests that for the most part 
the regional spot markets are relatively isolated, 
particularly in Queensland and South Australia. 
Nevertheless, the Victorian electricity crisis is just one of 
several shocks that suggests that spot electricity pricing 
and volatility in each Australian electricity spot market is 
potentially dependent on pricing conditions in the several 
other markets.  
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2.  Data and summary statistics 
 
The data employed in the study are daily spot prices for electricity encompassing the period from 
the date of commencement of the National Electricity Market (NEM) on 13 December 1998 to 
30 June 2001. All price data is obtained from the  National Electricity Market Company 
(NEMMCO) originally on a half-hourly basis representing 48 trading intervals in each 24-hour 
period. Following Lucia and Schwartz (2001) a series of daily arithmetic means is drawn from 
the trading interval data.  Although such treatment entails the loss of at least some ‘ news’ 
impounded in the more frequent trading interval data, daily averages play an important role in 
electricity markets, particularly in the case of financial contracts. For example, the electricity 
futures contract currently traded on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) is settled against the 
arithmetic mean of half hourly spot prices in a given month. Moreover, De Vany and Walls 
(1999a; 1999b) and Robinson (2000) both employ daily spot prices in their respective analyses 
of the western United States and United Kingdom spot electricity markets.  
 
TABLE 3. Summary statistics of spot prices in five Australian electricity markets 
  NSW  QLD  SA  SNO  VIC 
 Mean  33.0244  42.7055  57.9171  32.5624  35.5077 
 Median  26.4246  30.4117  38.9352  26.5121  25.3052 
 Maximum  388.2060  1175.5260  1152.5750  366.1698  1014.6010 
 Minimum  11.6533  13.2871  11.5225  11.0992  4.9785 
 Std. Dev.  29.6043  60.8140  92.1549  27.8366  58.5227 
 CV  0.8964  1.4240  1.5912  0.8549  1.6482 
 Skewness  6.8871  11.6290  7.6208  6.8653  12.0381 
 Kurtosis  66.2028  187.4572  69.3994  69.0835  179.8255 
 Jarque-Bera  127447  1052805  141362  138754  970003 
 JB probability  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 ADF test  -5.5564  -7.6672  -8.8834  -6.1225  -8.2235 
Notes: NSW – New South Wales, QLD – Queensland, SA – South Australia, SNO – Snowy 
Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme, VIC – Victoria. ADF – Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
statistics; CV – coefficient of variation; JP – Jarque-Bera. Hypothesis for ADF test: H0: unit 
root (non-stationary), H1: no unit root (stationary). The lag orders in the ADF equations are 
determined by the significance of the coefficient for the lagged terms. Only intercepts are 
included. Critical values are -3.4420 at.01, -2.8659 at .05 and  -2.5691 at the .10 levels. 
 
Table 3 presents the summary of descriptive statistics of the daily spot prices for the five 
electricity markets.  Samples means, medians, maximums, minimums, standard deviations, 
skewness, kurtosis and the Jacque-Bera statistic and p-value are reported. Between 13 December 
1998 and 30 June 2001, the highest spot prices are in Queensland (QLD) and South Australia 
(SA) averaging $42.71 and $57.92 per megawatt-hour, respectively. The lowest spot prices are in 
New South Wales (NSW) and the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme (SNO) with $33.02 
and $32.56, r espectively. The standard deviations for the spot electricity range from $27.84 
(Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme) to $92.15 (South Australia). Of the five markets, New 
South Wales (NSW) and  the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme (SNO)  are the least 
volatile, while Queensland (QLD) and South Australia (SA) are the most volatile. The value of 
the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the mean price) measures the degree of 
variation in spot price relative to the mean spot price. Relative to the average spot price, New 
South Wales (NSW) and the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme (SNO) are less variable Worthington, Kay-Spratley and Higgs 
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than South Australia (SA) and Victoria (VIC). A visual perspective on the volatility of spot 
prices can be gained from the plots of daily spot prices for each series in Figure 2.  
 













































The distributional properties of the spot price series generally appear non-normal. All of the spot 
electricity markets are positively skewed and since the kurtosis, or degree of excess, in all of 
these electricity markets exceeds three, a leptokurtic distribution is also indicated. The calculated 
Jarque-Bera statistic and corresponding p-value in Table 3 is used to test the null hypotheses that 
the daily distribution of spot prices is normally distributed. All p-values are smaller than the .01 
level of significance suggesting the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. These daily spot prices 
are then well approximated by the normal distribution. Lastly, each price series is tested for the 
presence of a unit root using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Contrary to previous 
empirical work De Vany and Walls (1999a; 1999b) which found that spot electricity prices 
contain a unit root, this study concurs with Lucia and Schwartz (2001) that electricity prices are 
stationary. 
 
3.  Multivariate GARCH model 
 
Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and generalised ARCH (GARCH) models 
that take into account the time-varying variances of univariate economic time series data have 
been widely employed. Suitable surveys of ARCH modeling in general and its widespread use in 
Notes: NSW – New South Wales, QLD – 
Queensland, SA – South Australia, SNO – 
Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme, 
VIC – Victoria. Worthington, Kay-Spratley and Higgs 
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finance applications may be found in Bera and Higgins (1993) and Bollerslev et al. (1992) 
respectively. Pagan (1996) also contains discussion of recent developments in this expanding 
literature. 
 
More recently, the univariate GARCH model has been extended to the multivariate GARCH 
(MGARCH) case, with the recognition that MGARCH models are potentially useful 
developments regarding the parameterization of conditional cross-moments. For example, 
Bollerslev (1990) used a MGARCH approach to examine the coherence in short-run nominal 
exchange rates, while Karolyi (1995) employed a similar model to examine the international 
transmission of stock returns between the United States and Canada. Dunne (1999) also 
employed a MGARCH model, though in the context of accommodating time variation in the 
systematic market-risk of the traditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM). And Kearney and 
Patton (2000) used a series of 3-, 4- and 5- variable MGARCH models to study the transmission 
of exchange rate volatility across European Monetary System (EMS) currencies prior to the 
introduction of the single currency. However, while the popularity of models such as these has 
increased in recent years, “…the number of reported studies of multivariate GARCH models 
remains small relative to the number of univariate studies” (Kearney and Patton 2000: 34).   
 
The following MGARCH model is developed to examine the joint processes relating the daily 
spot prices for five electricity markets from 13 December 1998 to 30 June 2001. The sample 
period is chosen on the basis that it represents a continuous series of data since the establishment 
of the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM). The following conditional expected price 
equation accommodates each market’s own prices and the prices of other markets lagged one 
period. 
 
t  t t e AP a P + + = -1   (1) 
 
where Pt is an n · 1 vector of daily prices at time t for each market and  ( ) t t- t H ~N I e , 0
1 . The n · 
1 vector of random errors, et is the innovation for each market at time t with its corresponding n 
· n conditional variance-covariance matrix, Ht. The market information available at time t - 1 is 
represented by the information set It-1. The n · 1 vector, a, represent long-term drift coefficients. 
The elements aij of the matrix A are the degree of mean spillover effect across markets, or put 
differently, the current prices in market i that can be used to predict future prices (one day in 
advance) in market j. The estimates of the elements of the matrix, A, can provide measures of the 
significance of the own and cross-mean spillovers. This multivariate structure then enables the 
measurement of the effects of the innovations in the mean spot prices of one series on its own 
lagged prices and those of the lagged prices of other markets.  
 
Engle and Kroner (1995) present various MGARCH models with variations to the conditional 
variance-covariance matrix of equations. For the purposes of the following analysis, the BEKK 
(Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner) model is employed, whereby the variance-covariance matrix of 
equations depends on the squares and cross products of innovation et and volatility Ht for each 
market lagged one period. One important feature of this specification is that it builds in sufficient 
generality, allowing the conditional variances and covariances of the electricity markets to 
influence each other, and, at the same time, does not require the estimation of a large number of Worthington, Kay-Spratley and Higgs 
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parameters (Karolyi 1995). The model also ensures the condition of a positive semi-definite 
conditional variance-covariance matrix in the optimisation process, and is a necessary condition 
for the estimated variances to be zero or positive. The BEKK parameterisation for the MGARCH 
model is written as: 
 
G H G C e e C B B H t t t t 1 1 - - ¢ + ¢ + ¢ =   (2) 
 
where bij are elements of an n · n symmetric matrix of constants B, the elements cij of the 
symmetric n · n matrix C measure the degree of innovation from market i to market j, and the 
elements gij of the symmetric n · n matrix G indicate the persistence in conditional volatility 
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In this parameterization, the parameters bij, cij and gij cannot be interpreted on an individual 
basis: “instead, the functions of the parameters which form the intercept terms and the 
coefficients of the lagged variance, covariance, and  error terms that appear in [(3)] are of 
interest” (Kearney and Patton 2000: 36). With the assumption that the random errors are 
normally distributed, the log-likelihood function for the MGARCH model is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ￿
=














   (4)  
 
where T is the number of observations, n is the number of markets, q is the vector of parameters 
to be estimated, and all other variables are as previously defined. The BHHH  (Berndt, Hall, Hall 
and Hausman) algorithm is used to produce the maximum likelihood parameter estimates and 
their corresponding asymptotic standard errors. Overall, the proposed model has twenty-five 
parameters in the mean equations, excluding the five constant (intercept) parameters, and twenty-
five intercept, twenty-five white noise and twenty-five volatility parameters in the estimation of 
the covariance process, giving one hundred and five parameters in total.    
 
Lastly, the Ljung-Box Q statistic is used to test for independence of higher relationships as 
manifested in volatility clustering by the MGARCH model [Huang and Yang 2000:329]. This 
statistic is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ￿
=
- - + =
p
j
j r j T T T Q
1
2 1 2    (5) 
 
where r(j) is the sample autocorrelation at lag j calculated from the noise terms and T is the 
number of observations. Q is asymptotically distributed as c
2 with (p - k) degrees of freedom and 
k is the number of explanatory variables. The test statistic in (5) is used to test the null hypothesis 
that the model is independent of the higher order volatility relationships. 
 Worthington, Kay-Spratley and Higgs 
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4.  Empirical results 
 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the conditional mean price equations are 
presented in Table 4. For the five electricity spot markets only QLD and SNO exhibit a 
significant own mean spillover from their own lagged electricity price. In both cases, the mean 
spillovers are positive. For example, in QLD a $1.00 per megawatt-hour increase in its own spot 
price will Granger cause an increase of $0.51 per megawatt-hour in its price over the next day. 
Likewise, a $1.00 per megawatt-hour increase in the SNO lagged spot price will Granger cause a 
$0.70 increase the next day. Importantly, there are no significant lagged mean spillovers from 
any of the spot markets to any of the other markets. This indicates that on average short-run price 
changes in any of the five Australian spot markets are not associated with price changes in any of 
the other spot electricity markets, despite the connectivity offered by the NEM. 
 
Table 4. Estimated coefficients for conditional mean price equations 























**12.8966  6.8610 
*16.0313  11.3500 16.18667  18.8600 
**12.2740  5.5630  11.2951 20.7400
ai1  0.0497  0.7556  -0.0135  0.0951  -0.0237  0.0844  0.5977  0.8215  0.0248 0.1749
ai2  0.0410  2.0470 
***0.5118  0.1291  -0.0658  0.2296  0.2046  2.2010  0.0321 0.4654
ai3  -0.1159  5.5800  -0.0529  0.3520  0.2493  0.1946  1.0097  5.6880  -0.0344 0.6905
ai4  -0.0548  0.2984  -0.0131  0.0778  -0.0265  0.0557 
**0.7001  0.3884  0.0318 0.1425
ai5  -0.1641  4.0450  -0.0049  0.3352  0.0310  0.1113  0.4664  4.0390  0.3102 0.5095
Notes: NSW – New South Wales, QLD –  Queensland, SA – South Australia, SNO – Snowy Mountains 
Hydroelectric Scheme, VIC – Victoria. Asterisks indicate significance at 
* - 0.10, 
** - 0.05, 
*** - 0.01 level 
 
The conditional variance covariance equations incorporated in the paper’s multivariate GARCH 
methodology effectively capture the volatility and cross volatility spillovers among the five spot 
electricity markets. These have not been considered by previous studies. Table 5 presents the 
estimated coefficients for the variance covariance matrix of equations. These quantify the effects 
of the lagged own and cross innovations and lagged own and cross volatility persistence on the 
own and cross volatility of the electricity markets. The coefficients of the variance covariance 
equations are generally significant for own and cross innovations and significant for own and 
cross volatility spillovers to the individual prices for all electricity markets, indicating the 
presence of strong ARCH and GARCH effects. In evidence, 68 percent (seventeen out of twenty-
five) of the estimated ARCH coefficients and 84 percent (twenty-one out of twenty-five) of the 
estimated GARCH coefficients are significant at the .10 level or lower. 
 
Own-innovation spillovers in all the electricity markets are large and significant indicating the 
presence of strong ARCH effects. The own-innovation spillover effects range from 0.0915 in 
VIC to 0.1046 in SNO. In terms of cross-innovation effects in the electricity markets, past 
innovations in most markets exert an influence on the remaining electricity markets. For 
example, in the case of VIC cross innovation in the NSW, SA and SNO markets are significant, 
of which NSW has the largest effect. The exception to the presence of strong cross innovation 
effects is QLD. No cross innovations outside of QLD influence that market, and the QLD market 
does influence any of the other electricity markets, at least over the period in question. This is 
consistent with the role of QLD in the NEM in that it has only limited direct connectivity with 
just one other regional spot market (NSW).      Worthington, Kay-Spratley and Higgs 
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In the GARCH set of parameters, eighty-four percent of the estimated coefficients are 
significant. For NSW the lagged volatility spillover effects range from 0.7839 for SA to 0.8412 
for QLD. This means that the past volatility shocks in QLD have a greater effect on the future 
NSW volatility over time than the past volatility shocks in other spot markets. Conversely, in 
QLD the post volatility shocks range from 0.65212 for SA to 0.8413 for SNO. In terms of cross-
volatility for the GARCH parameters, the most influential markets would appear to be NSW and 
SNO. That is, past volatility shocks in the NSW and SNO electricity spot markets have the 
greatest effect on the future volatility in the three remaining electricity markets. 
 
TABLE 5. Estimated coefficients for variance covariance equations 
  NSW (j  = 1)  QLD (j = 2)  SA (j = 3)  SNO (j = 4)  VIC (j = 5) 





















***80.2657  16.6300  18.7260  59.5500  120.9672 124.3000 
***71.3986  12.8500  75.8586  78.8900 
b2j  18.7260  59.5500 
***336.6956  99.0900  41.1680 332.7000  17.1266  66.2000  31.8362 285.4000 
b3j  120.9672 124.3000  41.1680 332.7000 
**635.0478 353.4000 
*120.0339  88.1800  229.8638 219.7000 
b4j 
***71.3986  12.8500  17.1266  66.2000 
*120.0339  88.1800 
***67.6679  11.7500 
**75.3265  41.9500 
b5j  75.8586  78.8900  31.8362 285.4000  229.8638 219.7000 
**75.3265  41.9500 
***295.1421  62.2100 
c1j 
***0.0985  0.0140  0.0997  0.1735 
***0.0989  0.0278 
***0.1013  0.0043 
***0.0992  0.0221 
c2j  0.0997  0.1735 
***0.1008  0.0198  0.1232  0.2944  0.0993  0.2777  0.0834  0.3979 
c3j 
***0.0989  0.0278  0.1232  0.2944 
***0.0991  0.0216 
***0.1021  0.0126 
***0.0937  0.0211 
c4j 
***0.1013  0.0043  0.0993  0.2777 
***0.1021  0.0126 
***0.1046  0.0105 
***0.0978  0.0175 
c5j 
***0.0992  0.0221  0.0834  0.3979 
***0.0937  0.0211 
***0.0978  0.0175 
***0.0915  0.0249 
g1j 
***0.8047  0.0133 
***0.8412  0.3192 
***0.7839  0.0959 
***0.8080  0.0001 
***0.8034  0.0447 
g2j 
***0.8412  0.3192 
***0.8051  0.0416  0.6520  1.3560 
**0.8413  0.4615  0.8234  1.0580 
g3j 
***0.7839  0.0959  0.6520  1.3560 
***0.8107  0.0309 
***0.7868  0.0961 
***0.8148  0.0263 
g4j 
***0.8080  0.0001 
**0.8413  0.4615 
***0.7868  0.0961 
***0.8098  0.0128 
***0.8056  0.0316 
g5j 
***0.8034  0.0447  0.8234  1.0580 
***0.8148  0.0263 
***0.8056  0.0316 
***0.8119  0.0233 
Notes: NSW – New South Wales, QLD –  Queensland, SA  – South Australia, SNO – Snowy Mountains 
Hydroelectric Scheme, VIC – Victoria. Asterisks indicate significance at 
* - 0.10, 
** - 0.05, 
*** - 0.01 level 
 
The sum of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients measures the overall persistence in each 
market’s own and cross conditional volatility. All five electricity markets exhibit strong own 
persistence volatility ranging from 0.9032 for NSW to 0.9143 for SNO. Thus, SNO has a lead-
persistence volatility spillover effect on the remaining electricity markets. The cross-volatility 
persistence spillover effects range from 0.7751 for SA 0.9409 for QLD.  
 
TABLE 6. Ljung-Box tests for standardized residuals 
  NSW  QLD  SA  SNO  VIC 
Statistic  27.0100  32.4600  44.7000  17.9700  50.8700 
p-value  0.0077  0.0012  0.0000  0.1166  0.0000 
 
Finally, the Ljung-Box (LB) Q statistics for the standardised residuals in Table 6 reveal that all 
electricity spot markets are highly significant (all have  p-values of less than .01) with the 
exception of SNO (a p-value of 0.1166). Significance of the Ljung-Box (LB) Q statistics for the 
electricity spot price series indicates linear dependences due to the strong conditional Worthington, Kay-Spratley and Higgs 
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heteroskedasticity. These Ljung-Box statistics then suggest a strong linear dependence in four 
out of the five electricity spot markets estimated by the MGARCH model. 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper highlights the transmission of prices and price volatility among five Australian 
electricity spot markets during the period 1998 to 2001. All of these spot markets are member 
jurisdictions of the recently established National Electricity Market (NEM). At the outset, unit 
root tests confirm that Australian electricity spot prices are stationary. A multivariate generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) model is used to identify the source 
and magnitude of spillovers. The estimated coefficients from the conditional mean price 
equations indicate that despite the presence of a national market for electricity, the state-based 
electricity spot markets are not integrated. In fact, only two of the five markets exhibit a 
significant own mean spillover. This would suggest, for the most part, that Australian spot 
electricity prices could not be usefully forecasted using lagged price information from either 
each market itself or from other markets in the national market.  However, own-volatility and 
cross-volatility spillovers are significant for nearly all markets, indicating the presence of strong 
ARCH and GARCH effects. Strong own and cross-persistent volatility are also evident in all 
Australian electricity markets. This indicates that while the limited nature of the interconnectors 
between the separate regional spot markets prevents full integration of these markets, shocks or 
innovations in particular markets still exert an influence on price volatility.  
 
Of course, the full nature of the price and volatility interrelationships between these separate 
markets could be either under or overstated by misspecification in the data. One possibility is 
that by averaging the half-hourly prices throughout the day, the speed at which innovations in 
one market influence another could be understated. For instance, with the data as specified the 
most rapid innovation allowed in this study is a day, whereas in reality innovations in some 
markets may affect others within just a few hours. Similarly, there has been no attempt to 
separate the differing conditions expected between peak and off-peak prices. For example, De 
Vany and Walls (1999) found that there were essentially no price differentials between trading 
points in off-peak periods because they were less constrained by limitations in the transmission 
system. These limitations, of course, suggest future avenues of research.    
 
The analysis could also be extended in a number of other ways. One approach would be to 
estimate a system of non-symmetrical conditional variance equations for an identical set of data. 
This would allow the analysis of cross volatility innovations and persistence to vary according to 
the direction of the information flow. Unfortunately, strict computing requirements did not 
permit the application of this model with the five electricity markets specified in the analysis. 
Another useful extension would be to examine each of the five electricity markets individually 
and in more detail. For example, while the sample for this study is determined by the period of 
tenure of the National Electricity Market (NEM) wholesale electricity spot markets in the 
separate states pre-date this by several years. An examination of the connection between the 
long-standing electricity spot markets in NSW and VIC would be particularly useful. Finally, the 
Sydney Futures Exchange (2000) has offered electricity futures contracts for two of Australia’s 
NEM jurisdictions, NSW and Victoria, since September 1997.  An examination of the Worthington, Kay-Spratley and Higgs 
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relationship between Australian spot and derivative electricity prices using, say, cointegration 
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